Logistic simulation has the potential to become an accepted support planThere is general agreement among the users of logistic ning and analysis tool that will meet the new DoD management demands to simulation models that the value of the models lies not in quantitatively link system design and support decisions to operational their ability to predict operational readiness in absolute terms, readiness objectives. Further understanding of the "real world," and incor-but rather in their ability to show relative differences in poration of this This paper reviews two simulation analyses performed on policies is the requirement that logistic supportability be a the Navy's new fighter/attack aircraft, F/A-18, as it was besystem acquisition consideration equal in importance to cost, ing prepared for a major production decision. One analysis schedule, and performance. DoD decision makers are now was primarily directed at evaluating organizational level taking a greater interest in the adequacy of system design (flight line) maintenance and assessing, in gross terms, the characteristics (e.g., reliability, maintainability) and logistic adequacy of supply support funding to achieve aircraft support plans and resources (manpower, spares, support readiness objectives. The second analysis evaluated the effects equipment, etc.) to meet operational readiness objectives for of intermediate level maintenance on aircraft readiness, and new systems within affordability constraints. Approaches to in the process, examined some of the widely used assumptions support planning, and to assessment of logistic supportabil-regarding variability of demand rates. Both analyses included ity, are rapidly shifting from the past acceptance of a critical examination of input data and model assumptions. qualitative judgments to a new demand for quantitative
readiness objectives.
simulation in determining aircraft squadron maintenance
Logistic simulation inputs and assumptions need to be subjected to critical manpower requirements and in evaluating the impact of examination in each application. In the case reviewed, it was found that the support-related deficiencies observed in operational testing.
commonly used assumption that mean failure rates are constant values, known with certainty, introduced significant errors in prediction of opera-The US Navy is using simulation in evaluating supply support tional readiness and sensitivity analysis results. The variability of mean de-funding requirements for the F/A-18 aircraft. The US Army mand has potentially far reaching implications concerning future support is using a simulation model in evaluating manpower and planning but further work is required to fully understand, characterize, logistic planning for the XM-1 tank in support of the fullmodel, and develop logistic support approaches that accommodate the production decision milestone.
variability.
Logistic simulation has the potential to become an accepted support planThere is general agreement among the users of logistic ning and analysis tool that will meet the new DoD management demands to simulation models that the value of the models lies not in quantitatively link system design and support decisions to operational their ability to predict operational readiness in absolute terms, readiness objectives. Further understanding of the "real world," and incor-but rather in their ability to show relative differences in poration of this understanding in input data and modeling techniques are required if the full potential of this support planning tool is to be realized.
operational readlness as a function of R&M parameters, logistic resource levels, or maintenance strategies. Experimen-INTRODUCTION tation has shown that simulation can produce reasonable and consistent results when used for sensitivity analysis. However, Since 1979, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has input data and model assumptions must be critically examissued a series of new policy directives [1] [2] [3] [4] on weapon system ined before simulation sensitivity analyses can be accepted as acquisition, logistic support, and reliability and main-a basis for management decisions. tainability (R&M). One important element of these new This paper reviews two simulation analyses performed on policies is the requirement that logistic supportability be a the Navy's new fighter/attack aircraft, F/A-18, as it was besystem acquisition consideration equal in importance to cost, ing prepared for a major production decision. One analysis schedule, and performance. DoD decision makers are now was primarily directed at evaluating organizational level taking a greater interest in the adequacy of system design (flight line) maintenance and assessing, in gross terms, the characteristics (e.g., reliability, maintainability) and logistic adequacy of supply support funding to achieve aircraft support plans and resources (manpower, spares, support readiness objectives. The second analysis evaluated the effects equipment, etc.) to meet operational readiness objectives for of intermediate level maintenance on aircraft readiness, and new systems within affordability constraints. Approaches to in the process, examined some of the widely used assumptions support planning, and to assessment of logistic supportabil-regarding variability of demand rates. Both analyses included ity, are rapidly shifting from the past acceptance of a critical examination of input data and model assumptions. qualitative judgments to a new demand for quantitative
The purposes of this paper are to illustrate the application analysis. This shift is motivated by a desire to avoid some of of logistic simulation models in a major acquisition program; the past readiness difficulties on operational weapon systems to show the potential utility of that approach in identifying that are traceable to a lack of visibility of supportability con-key sensitivities and evaluating tradeoffs; and to suggest areas siderations in the acquisition phase. There is a need, both in where improvements in simulation modeling approaches and industry and government, for analytic methods to assess the assumptions are needed. INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE ANALYSIS supporting decisions on whether the planned spares budget was adequate and in assessing the need for further reliabili-
The parallel analysis simulated, in detail, a subsystem ty improvement. The uncertainty range shown in figure 2 of the aircraft that does not share resources (test equipillustrates that the analysis provided gross relationships ment, men, or spares) with other subsystems within the inamong decision variables, rather than precise estimates of termediate maintenance shop, and treated the rest of the spares requirements.
aircraft in aggregate form. This allowed the visibility of inBefore decisions were made based on the simulation termediate level interactions and their impact on aircraft results, an understanding of the effect the assumptions and readiness. The F/A-18 subsystem chosen for the analysis of intermediate level maintenance was the radar. The radar
The results of the intermediate maintenance analysis is comprised of five WRAs, which in turn contain a total confirmed the importance of achieving projected reliability of 50 SRAs. Both WRAs and SRAs are supported by a levels, as shown in figure 3 . Stated another way, if spares dedicated piece of automatic test equipment in the in-levels are based on an expectation of eight MFHBMA, termediate shop. The maintenance concept for the F/A-18 then any actual reliability level lower than eight MFHBMA radar is to replace faulty WRAs in the aircraft with good will degrade readiness. WRAs from supply, and repair the WRA and its SRAs
The intermediate maintenance analysis also showed the aboard ship using the dedicated automatic test equipment influence on aircraft readiness of key resources within the and micro-miniature repair techniques. To represent the intermediate maintenance shop. A critical resource required planned total intermediate level workload of WRAs and within the I-level shop is the availability of time on the SRAs, three squadrons of F/A-18s deployed on one ship automatic test equipment used to isolate faulty SRAs within were simulated instead of the one squadron simulated in WRAs and faulty components on SRAs. Figure 4 shows, the higher level analysis. Data used in this analysis came from the Navy's organizational level maintenance simula--___ tion, the LSA, and maintenance data from comparable 1.00 current fleet aircraft. These data, plus a detailed descrip- maintenance, parameters reflecting the rest of the aircraft were held constant. For example, when radar reliability for the wartime scenario, the impact on aircraft readiness was varied, the reliability of the rest of the aircraft re-of various levels of on-station time for units-under-test. mained unchanged, or when radar spares levels were The degradation inreadinessisattributedto theincrease in changed, the spares effectiveness for the remainder of the the queue of WRAs and SRAs awaiting test and the aircraft was not. resulting increase in I-level turnaround time ( Figure 5 ).
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This is asumed to be an anomaly in the reported data. shows the sensitivity of wartime sortie rate to different mand rates per 100 flight hours for F-14 radar WRAs at levels of supply support investment (WRA and SRA spares five different sites during approximately equal time inter-per ship) developed using baseline conditions. Spares vals (six months) at about the same time (1978) (1979) . For quantities were based on predicted WRA and SRA mean example, for the first WRA, 74A4E, the mean demand demand rates. To simulate the effect of uncertainty in derate is 1.26. This fleet mean would normally be used as the mand, the failure rate of one randomly selected SRA basis for logistic support planning for the average site. within each of the five WRAs was increased by a factor of However, two of the sites experienced appreciably higher four, and all other SRA failure rates were uniformly demand rates which, if not anticipated, would adversely decreased so that each WRA retained its original predicted affect support at those sites. Similar variation is exhibited failure rate. (This restriction was necessary so that the infor each of the WRAs. The variation appears also from termediate shop workload, queuing, etc., would remain at time interval to time interval at an individual site as is the baseline level, and any drop in operational readiness shown by the additional line for site 5.
would be attributable solely to uncertainty in the predicSpares allowance quantities for aircraft carrier tion of SRA mean demand rates.) Inventory levels were deployments are computed based on the fleet average de-not changed, and still reflected the original reliability mand rates for each WRA and SRA, or, occasionally, estimates. To complete the representation of variability of based on the demand rates observed in a previous deploy-demand, the probability of having available piece parts for ment. The F-14 data indicate that neither of these is likely repair was reduced on the SRAs with higher-thanto be an accurate estimate of the mean demand rates that predicted failure rates to reflect the increased usage of will be experienced in the next deployment. When the ac-repair parts. Curve B shows the resulting drop in aircraft tual demand rates differ from the predicted rates upon readiness given these conditions. Unpredicted variation in which the WRA and SRA spares allowances were based, it the demand rate for just five SRAs and the associated is obvious that over-and under-supply conditions will repair parts resulted in a significant drop in total aircraft result.
readiness. Both simulation analyses to this point assumed that the This example is obviously artifical. It is unlikely that a mean demand rates experienced in deployment would be 4-fold increase in mean demand rate would occur in exidentical to the predicted rates used in spares provisioning. actly one SRA per WRA, or that the corresponding WRA To examine the impact of variability of demand, a simple demand rates would remain unchanged from predicted rates. In fact, the mean demand rate for each WRA Another key assumption was "unlimited cannibalizaof the variability and determine ways to eliminate or tion," i.e., a WRA could be removed from any aircraft predict it on a case by case basis. Factors which should be already down awaiting parts, to fill a "hole" in another considered include individual hardware configuration, aircraft for which no spare WRA was available. In pracmission profiles, operating environment, operator in-tice, there are some limits on the amount of cannibalizafluence, maintenance technician influence, data reporting, tion permitted. It was judged that this assumption would and maintenance procedures. Given that the cause could cause the analytic results to understate the requirement for be determined, it might be advantageous to eliminate the spare WRA's needed to reach the operational readiness variability, or in other cases, predict future variability and goal. Hence, with regard to deciding whether the planned allocate support resources accordingly to maximize spare WRA budget was adequate, this was viewed as a conweapon system readiness. This area is ripe for further servative assumption. On the other hand, the WRA invenstudy.
tory used in the simulation was not an optimized spares list Some degree of variability will inevitably continue to (i.e., least cost mix of WRA's to achieve supply availability exist. There are several possible approaches for objectives). This was viewed as a factor that would tend to characterizing variability of demand and for explicitly overstate the spares budget requirement. The effects of modeling it. These are addressed briefly in Appendix 2.
these and other modeling assumptions were qualitatively Alternative logistic support strategies that hedge assessed and presented to decision makers along with the against variability can be evaluated with a simulation ap-quantitative simulation results. proach that explicitly treats variability of demand. There are numerous support strategies that would provide accep-Input Data Figure 6 , curve C represents the result of the F/A-18 prime contractor, McDonnell Aircraft Comdoing this for our simple example. Most of the operational pany. The LSA estimates were based on field R&M exreadiness lost due to variation in the SRA demand rate is perience with comparable WRA's adjusted to account for "bought back" by this strategy. The cost of enhanced repair specific F/A-18 design improvements. At the weapon part support is not known but is estimated at an additional 10 system level, these LSA estimates were roughly equivalent percent of inventory cost. Many other considerations to 1.8 mean flight hours between failure (dotted line in (storage, administrative procedures, etc.) would need to be in- Figure 1 ). This appeared reasonable in comparison to curvestigated prior to implementing such an approach. rently operating aircraft (0.9-1.2 MFHBF for F-4 and A third alternative might be to monitor demands during A-7), and at the same time was more conservative than the the first half of a deployment, and make a mid-cruise spares Navy's goal of 2.4 MFHBF when the F/A-18 design is allowance~~~~~~~~~ãdutmntoices huniiso rAan mature. Similar comparisons were performed for other in-...~~~~~~~rts This , puts to the model, and it was concluded that the baseline SRAs exhibiting higher-than-predicted demand aesTl set of inputs provided a reasonable point of departure for would require continuous monitoring of demands and rapid the sensitivity analysis.
recomputation of allowance quantities. We suggest that a simulation approach that explicitly Sensitivity Range treats variability of demand (as outlined in Appendix 2) will be a most useful tool in evaluating these and other
The foremost management issue for the Navy's F/A-18 strategies.
analysis was whether the planned budget for outfitting car-riers with spare WRA's would adequately meet operational g(A) pdf of A readiness objectives. The sensitivity analysis examined a x number of demands in a fixed time interval, wide range of spares levels, and the resulting operational J(xIA) pdf of x given that the mean demand rate is A. readiness. Of equal importance, however, was the fact that The unconditional pdf of x isthe analysis included concurrent examination of the sensitivity of operational readiness to some of the input f(x) = fO f(xjA) g(A)dA.
parameters having a wide range of uncertainty (e.g., reliability). This provided an indication of the effects of For some choices of g(A) and f(xlA) this expression is such uncertainties on the adequacy of the spares budget. Returning to the original premise of this paper, which squared error between prediction and realization than was that simulation is a practical and useful tool for would be obtained using individual or collective site evaluating the effects of alternative support plans and average. This approach is not as powerful as coming to resource levels on system readiness, the question arises as grips with the causes of variability, but its ease of im-to how to treat variability of demand more formally than plementation in situations where only demand history data the arbitrary adjustment of WRA and SRA failure rates are available makes it a candidate for further investigation. used in our simple example. The simulation approach previously used with constant mean failure rates can easily Accounting for Variability of Demand be modified to explicitly model variability. One approach in Spares Computations is:
Step 1-For each predicted WRA and SRA deConventional (constant demand rate) spares inventory p models do not take into account the contribution of variamand rate, construct a distribution about the tion about the mean demand rate to the overall variation in predicted mean (e.g., a Normal distribution or the number of demands within a resupply interval (the Gamma distribution, with mean-to-variance basis for spares computation in most models). Hence, the ratio based on historical demand data).
supply effectiveness measure (fill rate, backorder rate,
Step 2-Compute spares and other support availability, etc.) calculated by a constant failure rate resource levels using predicted mean demand model will prove to be over stated.
rates and either conventional (constant failure To get a more accurate calculation of anticipated suprate) computational methods or a sparing apply effectiveness, the variability of demand rates can be exproach that makes use of the prior distributions plicitly included in the sparing computations. constructed in Step 1.
Step 3-Using Monte Carlo techniques, ranNotation domly select from the WRA and SRA failure rate distributions a set of mean failure rates to A mean demand rate be used as inputs to the simulation model.
